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Competition enforcement and human rights after the Treaty of Lisbon: the 
state of play and the (near) future prospects 
 
Introduction 
 
EU Competition enforcement has undergone major changes over the past decade, 
ranging from the enactment of the Modernisation Regulation, seeking to establish 
greater cooperation across the EU as well as to boost private enforcement, to the 
identification of new priorities and novel, more economics based approaches to the 
application of the substantive competition rules.  Whereas these reforms have left 
intact the “integrated agency model” governing the Commission’s role, subject to the 
judicial review of the EU Courts, they have resulted in stronger investigative, 
decision-making and remedial powers.  Consequently, while it is clear that the 
Commission’s role has been strengthened, no specific measure has been adopted in 
order to deal with the long standing criticism, brought against the current institutional 
structure and concerning its alleged lack of compliance with the due process rules 
enshrined in European human rights catalogues, such as the European Convention 
on Human Rights (hereinafter referred to as ECHR).   
         These concerns have become more significant due to the implications of the 
Treaty of Lisbon for human rights’ protection: the 2009 Treaty on the Function of the 
European Union (hereinafter referred to as TFEU) has not only made the rules 
contained in the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights binding on the EU agencies as 
well as on the domestic authorities acting within the scope of EU law; it has also 
created an express legal basis for the accession of the Union to the ECHR, thus 
envisaging the possibility that EU action be subject to the scrutiny of the European 
Court of Human Rights.   
         Against this background, a number of questions emerge.  From a substantial 
point of view, it may be wondered whether these more pervasive investigation and 
decision-making powers are adequately counterbalanced by the applicable standards 
of due process in a way which is compatible with the Convention.  The paper will 
consider the existing degree of protection provided by EU law to the right to “privacy” 
of business premises against inspections and examine them in the light of the 
corresponding rules contained in Article 8 of the ECHR; it will also examine the 
possible divergences between the EU right to remain silence and the Convention’s 
own standards of protection against self-incrimination.  Against this background, it 
will be argued that these two cases may well offer the opportunity for individual 
claimants to mount a “challenge” against the fairness of the Commission’s 
competition investigations under the Convention.   
         Thereafter, the paper will illustrate the existing interpretation given by both the 
Commission and the EU Courts to the principle of ne bis in idem in the context of 
competition enforcement; it will be submitted that although Article 50 of the EU 
Charter of Fundamental Rights echoes the high standards of protection against 
double jeopardy already affirmed by the European Court of Human Rights, the same 
principle does not appear to apply with the same intensity in competition proceedings 
across the European Competition Network, thus openly questioning the extent to 
which the safeguard of this right in the EU legal system may be considered 
“equivalent” to that offered by the ECHR. 
         Accession to the ECHR on the part of the EU also raises serious procedural 
questions, ranging from how individuals can seek the protection of their rights within 
the Convention framework against actions of the Union institutions or indeed of 
domestic agencies implementing EU law, to how the unity, autonomy and 
consistency of EU law can be safeguarded once the Union itself agrees to be bound 
by external normative standards and to be subject to scrutiny exercised by an 
external court.  These questions appear even more urgent and complex in the 
context of EU competition enforcement, since Council Regulation No 1/2003 relies on 
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the close cooperation of the NCAs with the Commission and with each other and is 
based on the principle of concurrent jurisdiction in the application of Articles 101 and 
102 TFEU.   
         Although the “delegated implementation” of EU law is a feature common to 
many policy areas, it will be suggested that identifying the respondent in these cases, 
i.e. whether an action should be brought against the EU or the Member State, is 
especially important not only for the individual applicant but also, more generally, for 
the scope of review exercised by the European Court of Human Rights, which may 
be called to scrutinise issues of allocation of competences at admissibility stage.  
This paper will discuss the existing proposal for a co-respondent mechanism, made 
in the Draft Accession agreement currently being negotiated by the EU institutions 
and the Member States; it will be argued that this solution, coupled with the 
involvement of the Court of Justice of the EU (hereinafter referred to as ECJ) via the 
preliminary reference proceedings in appropriate cases, may strike the right balance 
between effective human rights’ protection and preserving the unity and autonomy of 
EU law.   
         The possibility to bring individual challenges against the EU raises further 
questions for the role of the ECJ: it will be argued that the involvement of the 
Luxembourg Court may be indispensable for the purpose of exhausting the domestic 
remedies, in accordance with the admissibility requirements laid down by Article 35 
of the Convention itself, as well as being required by the need to safeguard the role 
of the Court itself as the “guardian of the Treaty”.  However, it will also be suggested 
that while meeting this condition may relatively straightforward when the measure 
under challenge is imputable to the European Commission, it may be more 
problematic when national competition agencies are involved, ranging from the 
timeliness of individual actions to the possibility that, due to the rules governing the 
preliminary reference procedure, domestic courts avoid making such a reference in 
specific cases. 
         The paper will conclude that the Treaty of Lisbon has brought about extremely 
significant changes to the framework for human rights’ protection in the EU, whose 
impact is widely felt also in the context of competition enforcement and which throws 
into question hitherto established assumptions.  It will be argued that while the ECHR 
is likely to introduce stronger human rights’ safeguards, it also raises a number of 
complex questions as to how these rights can be enforced by individual claimants 
and with what consequences for the role of the Commission and its domestic 
partners as well as, more generally, for the inner coherence and the institutional 
balance of the EU as a whole.  
 
2. Of companies, human rights and due process: a tale of two jurisdictions? 
 
2.1. Human rights protection and EU competition investigations: brief introductory 
remarks 
 
An examination of the issues concerning human rights’ protection in the EU, whether 
generally or in the specific context of competition enforcement, goes beyond the 
remit of this contribution.  It is however indispensable to note that these matters have 
been at the forefront of the debate since the early days of the EEC, having 
constituted a “bone of contention” for domestic courts concerned with the 
consequences of the supremacy of EU law. These questions also struck at the core 
of the interplay between the implementation of the Treaty obligations, very often 
through domestic authorities’ actions, and the observance of Europe-wide human 
rights’ guarantees, such as those provided by the European Convention on Human 
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Rights.1  As is well known, the ECJ succeeded in developing autonomous EU human 
rights principles, inspired by and centred upon the rules of the ECHR, principles 
which were later ”consolidated” into the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights.2   
           At the same time, the European Court of Human Rights recognised in a 
number of judgments that the level of fundamental rights’ protection offered by EU 
law could be “presumed” to be equivalent to that of the Convention, in consideration 
of their substance and of their means of enforcement.3  The Strasbourg Court 
famously held in Bosphorous that unless the applicant proved that these guarantees 
had been “manifestly deficient” in the circumstances of a particular case, individual 
Contracting States could not be held to account for infringements arising from EU 
action.4   The centrality of the Convention within the EU human rights’ principles was 
confirmed by both the EU Charter, whose “horizontal clauses” aim at ensuring 
consistency with it, and by the Treaty of Lisbon, which provides an express legal 
basis for accession.5   
         In this specific respect it should be emphasised that negotiations are currently 
in progress to ensure that this objective is achieved consistently with the principles of 
consistency, autonomy and supremacy of EU law and in the respect of the inter-
institutional balance of the EU framework as a whole.6  These developments were 
                                                 
1
 See e.g. case 11/70, Internationale Handelsgesellschaft v Einfuhr und Vorratstelle fur Getreide und 
Futtermittel, [1970] ECR 1125; cf. the adverse position of the German Constitutional Court, described, 
inter alia, in CROSSLAND, “Three major decisions given by the Bunderverfassungsgericht (Federal 
Constitutional Court)”, (1994) 19 ELRev 202, and reversed only in case 69/85, Wunsche 
Handelsgesellschaft, [1986] ECR 947; also case C-5/88, Wachauf v Bundesamt fur Ernahrung und 
Fortwirtschaft, [1989] ECR 2609, para. 19; see also case C-260/89, ERT AE v DEP and Sotirios 
Kouvelas, [1991] ECR I-2925, para. 42-43.   See e.g. DOUGLAS-SCOTT, The Constitutional Law of 
the European Union, 2002: Longman, p. 432; also WEILER, “Eurocracy and distrust: some questions 
concerning the role of the European Court of Justice in the protection of fundamental human rights 
within the legal order of the European Communities”, (1986) 61 Wash. Law Rev. 1103 at 1111; see 
also DAUSES, “The protection of Fundamental Rights in the Community Legal Order”, (1985) 10 
ELRev 398 at 400. 
2
 Case 4/73, Nold v Commission, [1974] ECR 491, para. 13. Also, see e.g. case C-112/00, E. 
Schmidtberger, Internationale Transporte und Planzuge v Austria, [2003] ECR I-5659, para. 56-57, 60 
and 64, also case C-540/03, European Parliament v Council, judgment of 27 June 2006, [2006] ECR I-
5769, para. 38.  For commentary, see, inter alia, BIONDI, “Free trade, a mountain road and the right to 
protest: European economic freedoms and fundamental individual rights”, (2004) EHRLR 51 at 58-59. 
 For commentary, inter alia, HARTLEY, The Foundations of European Community Law, 5
th
 Ed., 2003, 
Oxford University Press, p. 137; also DeBURCA & ASCHENBRENNER, “The development of 
European constitutionalism and the role of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights”, (2003) 9 Colum. J. 
Eur. L. 355 at 379. 
3
 See appl. No. 40302/98, Matthews v United Kingdom, [1999] 28 EHRR 361, para. 33.  Also, mutatis 
mutandis, appl. No 26083, Waite and Kennedy v Germany, [1999] 30 EHRR 261 at para. 68.  For 
commentary, inter alia, SCHERMERS, Matthews v United Kingdom, judgment of 18 February 1999, 
case comment, (1999) 36 CMLRev 673 at 679.  See also appl. No 45036/98, Bosphorous Hava Yollari 
Turizm ve Ticaret Anonim Sirketi v Ireland, judgment of 30 June 2005, [2006] 42 EHRR 1, para. 160-
164; see also separate Opinion of Judge Ress, para. 3.  For commentary see e.g. CALLEWAERT, “The 
European Convention on Human Rights and EU Law: a long way to harmony”, (2009) EHRLR 768 at 
777; also HARMSEN, “National responsibility for European Community acts under the European 
Convention on Human Rights: recasting the accession debate”, (2001) 7 EPL 625 at 645-647. 
4
 Appl. No 45036/98, Bosphorous Hava Yollari Turizm ve Ticaret Anonim Sirketi v Ireland, judgment 
of 30 June 2005, [2006] 42 EHRR 1, para. 155. 
5
 See Article 6(2) TEU; cf. Opinion 2/94, on Accession of the Community to the ECHR, [1996] ECR I-
1759, para. 27.  See, inter alia, YOUNG, “The Charter, Constitution and human rights: is this the 
beginning or the end for human rights protection by Community law?”, (2005) 11 EPL 219 at 226-227; 
also SYRPIS, “The Treaty of Lisbon: much ado…but about what?”, (2008) ILJ 219 at 232-233. 
6
 See First Draft agreement on the accession of the EU to the Convention, CDDH-UE (2011) 04; 
revised agreements, CDDH-UE(2011) 06 and 10; for commentary, see e.g. Lock, “Walking on a 
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welcomed as a means of “filling the gaps”, substantial and procedural, resulting from 
the approach adopted by the European Court of Human Rights in Bosphorous.7   
           It was emphasised that, after accession, the EU would be held responsible for 
human rights’ breaches occurring within its jurisdiction, regardless of whether there 
had been an involvement of the authorities of the Member States and of the nature of 
that involvement.8  Formal accession would also allow the EU institutions to 
participate to the proceedings before the Strasbourg Court, in the forms prescribed 
by the accession agreement, thereby ensuring that the “Union interest” be 
adequately represented during these proceedings.9  At the same time, however, it is 
undeniable that accession would have a number of significant implications for 
integrity of the human rights acquis of the Union and for the role of the ECJ itself vis-
à-vis the courts of the Member States and in respect to the scrutiny exercised by the 
Human Rights’ court.   
          Having regard especially to the EU competition enforcement framework, the 
growth and the consolidation of this acquis into the EU Charter has fuelled the 
debate on the question of whether the nature of proceedings and the intensity of the 
investigative and decision-making powers enjoyed by the Commission and by the 
NCAs in this area complied with the basic “due process” guarantees enshrined in the 
Convention.10  Commentators argued that the observance on the part of the Union of 
the principles enshrined in the rule of law, and especially of the values of personal 
and economic freedom and of democracy,11 justified the extension of fundamental 
rights-type safeguards to commercial actors, whether natural or legal persons.12  
Although it was recognised that the degree of protection assigned to entities active 
on the market and more generally in a “commercial context”, could be weaker than 
that applied to natural persons acting within, for instance, the political arena, it was 
accepted that undertakings could claim the respect of basic guarantees, such as the 
right to a “fair trial” and to a “fair procedure” and a limited “right to privacy”.13 
          These arguments appear even more pressing if regard is had to the features of 
competition proceedings before the Commission: the all-encompassing nature of the 
concept of “undertaking”, which spans from incorporated entities to natural persons,14 
and the ostensibly punitive nature of the sanctions that can be imposed on those 
responsible for competition infringements  have strengthened the view that these 
                                                                                                                                            
tightrope: the draft ECHR accession agreement and the autonomy of the EU legal order”, (2011) 48 
CMLRev 1025, especially pp. 1028 ff. 
7
 Lock, cit. (fn. 6), p. 1027-1028. 
8
 Ibid.  See also, inter alia, Syrpis, cit. (fn. 5), pp. 225-226.  See e.g. appl. No 73274/01, Connolly v 15 
Member States, judgment of 9 December 2008; cf., more recently, appl. No 30696/09, MSS v Belgium, 
judgment of the Grand Chamber, 21 January 2011, [2011] 53 EHRR 2, para. 338-340, 347-349. 
9
 Jacque’, “The accession of the European Union to the European Convention on Human Rights and 
Fundamental freedoms”, (2011) 48 CMLRev 995 at 1007-1008. 
10
 For a detailed assessment of these issues, see EMBERLAND, The human rights of companies, 2005: 
OUP; see especially pp. 180 et seq.; see also ANDREANGELI, EU competition enforcement and 
human rights, 2008: E Elgar, pp. 18 et seq.; Merola et al. (Ed.), Toward the optimal enforcement of the 
competition rules in Europe, 2010: Brussels, Bruylant, Ch. 5. 
11
 See e.g. case 249/83, Parti Ecologiste Les Verts v European Parliament, [1986] ECR 1339, para. 22-
23. 
12
 See e.g. Appl. No 13710/88, Niemitz v Germany, Ser. A No 251-B, [1993] 16 EHRR 17, para. 29; 
also Appl. No 37971/97, Ste Colas Est and others v France, judgment of 16 April 2002, [2004] 39 
EHRR 17, para. 40-41; Appl. No 10572/83, Markt Intern Verlag GmbH and Klaus Bermann v 
Germany, judgment of 20 November 1989, Ser. A No 165, [1990] 12 EHRR 161, para. 26, 35. 
13
 See e.g. Emberland, cit. (fn. 10), p. 180-182; see e.g. appl. No 14369/88, Noviflora Sweden AB v 
Sweden, Commission Decision, [1993] 15 EHRR CD6; para. 2(b) and 4.  
14
 See e.g. case C-309/99, Wouters and others v Algemene Raad van der Nederlandsen Ordre van 
Advocaten, [2002] ECR I-1577, para.  48-49. 
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proceedings have a “criminal law character” and should therefore be regarded as 
falling within the remit of the Convention.15    
         On this point, the European Court of Human Rights has constantly held that 
demands of “flexibility” and “efficiency” could justify conferring decision making 
powers to non-judicial bodies16 in matters that in principle required a hearing before 
an “independent and impartial tribunal”.17  In these cases, however, to meet the 
Convention requirements of due process, the contracting states would have to 
ensure, at a minimum, that the decision adopted by such non-judicial bodies be 
subjected to “full” judicial control as regards all aspects of law, fact and merits, by a 
“court of law”.18  Although the ECJ had initially denied that Article 6 of the Convention 
would be applicable to EU competition enforcement action, on the ground that the 
Commission was entrusted with a merely administrative function in this area,19 it later 
came to accept that a number of fairness principles should be considered as relevant 
also for these proceedings, such as, inter alia, a limited right to silence in the face of 
incriminating questioning, to resist disclosure of certain privileged communications 
and to challenge the validity of compulsory investigative measures before the 
General Court.20 
       However, the Commission’s practice and the EU Courts’ case law have shown 
that, despite the Union’s commitment to the respect of human rights to a standard 
inspired by the ECHR, significant divergences remain between the Convention’s and 
the EU law’s notion of specific features of what constitutes a “fair procedure”.  
Although the “integrated agency model” characterising the Commission’s framework 
,is not per se incompatible with the Convention, the impact of its extensive fact-
finding powers has led to outcomes that are not easy to reconcile with the safeguards 
of its Article 6.21  In addition, the push toward greater cooperation with and 
                                                 
15
See appl. No 11598/85, Stenuit v France, [1992] ECC 401, para. 56-61; also appl. No 73053/01, 
Jussila v Finland, [2007] 45 EHRR 39, para. 43.  For commentary, inter alia, WILS “The combination 
of the Investigative and prosecutorial function and the adjudicative function in EC Antitrust 
enforcement: a legal and economic analysis”, (2004) 27 W. Comp. 201 at 208.  See also, mutatis 
mutandis, appl. No 7598/76, Kaplan v United Kingdom, Commission Decision, [1982] 4 EHRR 64, 
para. 150; also appl. No 15523/89, Schmautzer v Austria, [1996] 21 EHRR 511, para. 28; appl. No 
8544/79, Ozturk v Germany, [1984] 6 EHRR 409, para. 55-56. 
16
Appl. Nos. 6878/75 and 7238/75, LeCompte, Van Leuven and de Meyere v Belgium, [1982] 4 EHRR 
1, para. 51.  See also appl. No 9273/81, Ettl v Austria, [1988] 10 EHRR 255, paras. 38 and 41; appl. No 
19178/91, Bryan v United Kingdom, Commission report, [1996] 21 EHRR 342, paras. 37-38. 
17
 Inter alia, appl. No. 8544/79, Ozturk v Germany, [1984] 6 EHRR 409 at paras. 49-50. 
18
Appl. Nos. 7299/75 and 7496/76, Albert & LeCompte v Belgium, [1983] 5 EHRR 533, para. 29. 
19
 Inter alia, cases 100-103/80, Musique de Diffusion Française v Commission, [1983] ECR 1825, per 
AG Slynn, p. 1920.  
20
 See e.g. case T-67/00, JFE v Commission, [2004] ECR II-2501, para. 177-178; Case C-105/04 P, 
Netherlandse Feteratieve Vereigning voor de Goothandel op Elektrotechnisch Gebied v Commission, 
Opinion of AG Kokott, delivered on 8 December 2005, [2006] ECR I-8725, para. 107-108. 
21
 For a consideration of the human rights’ implication of the action of the Commission as “integrated 
agency see e.g. case 41/69, ACF Chemiefarma v Commission, [1970] ECR 661; case 45/69, Boehringer 
Mannheim v Commission [1970] ECR 769; case C-62/86, AKZO v Commission, [1991] ECR I-3359; 
cases T- 10, 11, 12 and 15/92, SA Cimenteries CBR & others v Commission, [1992] ECR II-1571; cases 
142 & 156/84, BAT & Reynolds v Commission, [1987] ECR 4487; see also case T-156/94, Siderurgica 
Aristrain Madrid SL v Commission, [1999] ECR II-645, para. 109; joined cases C-189/02, 202/02, 205-
208/02 and 213/02, Dansk Rorindustri and others v Commission, [2005] ECR I-5425.  For 
commentary, see e.g. BAILEY, “Scope of judicial review under Article 81 EC”, (2004) 41 CMLRev 
1327.  For the position of the European Court of Human Rights see inter alia appl. No 9749/82, W v 
United Kingdom, [1988] 10 EHRR 29, para. 64; also mutatis mutandis, appl. No 11761/85, Obermeier 
v Austria, [1991] 13 EHRR 290, para. 69; appl. No 19178/91, Bryan v United Kingdom, [1996] 21 
EHRR 342, para. 46.  For commentary, see e.g. POUSTIE, “The rule of law or the rule of lawyers? 
Alconbury, Article 6(1) and the role of courts in administrative decision-making”, (2001) 6 EHRLR 657 
at 663; also ANDREANGELI, cit. (fn. 10), p. 64 et seq. 
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decentralised enforcement by the NCAs, on the basis of a principle of parallel, 
shared jurisdiction, has questioned the extent to which the Union’s commitment to 
the protection against double jeopardy, enshrined not just in the Convention’s 
Protocol VII, but also in Article 50 of the EU Charter, is truly upheld in the context of 
competition enforcement.   
             It is emphasised that these issues are all the more pressing today, with 
accession to the ECHR getting underway and therefore, paving the way toward 
potential challenges of these practices and procedures before the Strasbourg Court.  
Consequently, the next sections will briefly address the “substantial” questions 
arising from the perceived “shortcomings” of the EU competition enforcement 
framework: the right to remain silent and to maintain a degree of “privacy” of 
commercial premises vis-à-vis inspections and the limited scope for the application of 
the principle of ne bis in idem will be illustrated at this juncture. 
 
2.2. The Commission fact-finding powers and the rights of the investigated parties: 
when “effectiveness” prevails over “fairness”—the case of the right to silence 
 
Section 2.1 provided a brief and non-exhaustive prologue to the discussion of the 
“substantial” questions arising from the interplay of the ECHR safeguards with the 
effective enforcement of the EU competition rules by the Commission either on its 
own or in partnership with the NCAs and argued that any divergence in the standards 
applicable, respectively in the EU and the Convention framework could herald the 
possibility for a direct challenge of the lawfulness of these proceedings.  For this 
reason, this section will consider the extent to which the exercise of individual 
investigative powers conferred to the Commission by Council Regulation No 1/2003 
remains compatible with the Convention.   
          According to Article 18 of the Regulation the Commission may ask any 
undertaking for “all the necessary information” pursuant to a “simple request” or of a 
binding decision, both indicating the legal basis and the purpose of the request, the 
nature of the information and the time limit within which to provide it.22  On this point, 
the ECJ made clear that while there is an expectation that the addressee of a “simple 
request” will cooperate with the investigating officers, cooperation following a simple 
request remains non-compulsory; should the undertaking concerned decide not to 
cooperate, however, the Commission may issue a binding decision, backed by 
pecuniary sanctions for non-compliance.23  Article 19 further empowers the 
Commission to interview natural or legal persons, with their consent, on any matter 
under investigation and with the assistance of the competent domestic authorities.  
Thus, unlike with Article 18 requests of written information, Article 19 allows the 
interviewees both to object to being questioned tout court and to refuse to answer 
specific questions.24 
                                                 
22
 See inter alia, RILEY, “Saunders and the power to obtain information in Community and United 
Kingdom competition law”, (2000) 25(3) ELRev 264 at 266; also, mutatis mutandis, BERGHE and 
DAWES, “ ‘Little pig, little pig, let me come in’: an evaluation of the European Commission’s powers 
of inspection in competition cases”, (2009) 30(9) ECLR 407 at 410-11; CALLEWAERT, “The 
European Convention on Human Rights and EU Law: a long way to harmony”, (2009) EHRLR 768 at 
775-776.  
23
 See e.g. case 136/79, National Panasonic v Commission, [1980] ECR 2033, para. 11-13; case 
374/87, Orkem v Commission, [1989] ECR 3283, para. 11, 13-14; case C-301/04 P, Commission v SGL 
Carbon, [2006] ECR I-5915, para. 40 and 44. 
24
 For the implications of Article 19 in respect to leniency applicants, see Commission Notice on 
immunity from fines in cartel cases, [2006] OJ C298/17 (also referred to as Leniency Notice), para. 32.  
For commentary, see e.g. FORT, “Access to evidence –the conflict between leniency and private 
antitrust litigation”, (2008) 1(1) GCLR 24 at 30; also RILEY, “The modernisation of EU anti-cartel 
enforcement: will the Commission grasp the opportunity?”, (2010) 31(5) ECLR 191 at 193. 
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        Against this background, it was often queried whether investigated parties to 
which Article 18 decisions are addressed can refuse to provide answers leading to a 
de facto admission of responsibility for an alleged infringement.  The right to remain 
silent in the face of actually or potentially self-incriminating questioning is recognised 
as an essential component of a “fair trial” by the European Court of Human Rights, 
according to which it should be for the prosecution to prove their case against the 
defendant;25 the Court added that this principle also seeks to protect the integrity of 
the will of any accused natural person against “improper” forms of coercion in the 
taking of evidence, whether in judicial or merely “investigative” proceedings.26  
         At the core of any assessment of the scope of this right in individual cases 
should be an appraisal of the nature and intensity of the coercion applied on the 
concerned party: thus, in Saunders the Strasbourg court took the view that the right 
to silence could be invoked to avoid answering “improper” questions, but not the 
handing over of evidence whose existence was “independent” of the will of the 
accused, such as written documents.27 Perhaps more importantly, the same Court 
held in O’ Halloran that the existence of appropriate safeguards attending the taking 
of the evidence within a regulatory framework established to achieve public interest 
goals could justify a certain degree of coercion upon the investigated party, without 
completely jeopardising her right to a “fair procedure”.28 
         In light of the above, it is apparent that the right to refuse to answer inculpating 
questions was originally framed to protect natural persons against improper 
“oppression” during questioning.29  It is nonetheless suggested that although the 
intensity of its protection cannot be as extensive for legal entities as it is for natural 
persons, its applicability to regulatory processes, including competition investigations, 
is consistent with the rule of law.30  Accordingly, it could be argued that its remit 
should be determined in relation to the nature of the coercion exerted on the 
investigated undertaking, to the features of the proceedings, including the 
involvement of the competent courts and the concurrent need to preserve the 
effectiveness of the regulatory structure concerned.31   
        The Convention’s solution to these questions may however be contrasted with 
the notion of right to silence fashioned by the ECJ for competition investigations.  It 
was anticipated that the Commission may compel undertakings to answer “all the 
necessary” questions on threat of pecuniary sanctions, including “incriminating” 
questions.  However, in the notorious Orkem decision the Court declined to 
recognise a right to silence as extensive as that provided under the ECHR, albeit 
within the limits imposed on it by the features of a regulatory framework.  It was held 
that while a limited degree of protection against potentially incriminating questioning 
                                                 
25
 Appl. No 10828/84,, Funke v France, ser. A-256/A, [1993] 16 EHRR 297; for commentary, see inter 
alia MacCULLOCH, “The privilege against self-incrimination in competition investigations: 
theoretical foundations and practical implications”, (2006) 26 (1) LS 211 at 231.  
26
 Case 43/1994/490/572, Saunders v United Kingdom, [1997] 23 EHRR 313, para. 68-69.  See also 
appl. Nos. 15809/02 and 25624/02, O’Halloran and Francis v United Kingdom, [2008] 46 EHRR 21, 
para. 47.  For commentary, inter alia, TRAINOR, “A comparative analysis of a corporation’s right 
against self-incrimination”, (1994-1995) 18 Fordham Int’l L J 2139 at 2165-66. 
27
 Case 43/1994/490/572, Saunders v United Kingdom, [1997] 23 EHRR 313, para. 69.  See e.g. 
RILEY, “Saunders and the power to obtain information in Community and United Kingdom 
competition law”, (2000) 25(3) ELRev 264 at 270-271. 
28
Appl. Nos. 15809/02 and 25624/02, O’ Halloran and Francis, cit. (fn. 48), para. 55 and 57. 
29
 MacCULLOCH, “The privilege against self-incrimination in competition investigations: theoretical 
foundations and practical implications”, (2006) 26 (1) LS 211 at 234-236. 
30
 See e.g. TRAINOR, “A comparative analysis of a corporation’s right against self-incrimination”, 
(1994-1995) 18 Fordham Int’l L J 2139 at 2165-66 and 2185-2186. 
31
 See e.g. appl. Nos. 15809/02 and 25624/02, O’Halloran and Francis v United Kingdom, [2008] 46 
EHRR 21, para. 47.  For commentary, inter alia, TRAINOR, loc. ult. cit.  
31
 EMBERLAND, cit. (fn. 10), p. 42-43; also TRAINOR, loc. ult. cit. 
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was available to all investigated parties since the early stages of an investigation, in 
order to avoid frustrating their rights of defence,32 this right could only go as far as to 
allow them to refuse an answer to “leading questions”, namely to questions whose 
answer may “involve an admission of the existence of an infringement which it is 
incumbent upon the Commission to prove.”33  
          Although later cases seemed to hint at the application of less rigid standards of 
protection, based on the nature and intensity of the coercion exercised on the 
concerned parties,34 the exclusion from the privilege of information concerning facts 
that could be known to them even though the evidence so gathered may be used to 
establish the existence of an antitrust infringement,35 has been criticised as 
undermining the effective protection of an already weak right to silence.  Some 
commentators pointed out that even merely factual answers may be just as damning 
as an admission of responsibility.36  By contrast, other authors suggested that this 
approach could represent an acceptable compromise between the need to uphold 
the effectiveness of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU and the protection of the rights 
enjoyed by investigated undertakings, in a framework characterised by the clear 
willingness of the EU legislature to strengthen the powers of the Commission.37  
        It is suggested that the EU notion of privilege remains difficult to reconcile with 
the corresponding standards of protection laid down by the ECHR: although it is 
accepted that any solution as to the scope of the right to silence should be inspired 
by a “balancing exercise” between effective enforcement and the respect for what 
constitutes a “fair procedure” in a regulatory context,38 this stark distinction between 
“factual” and “leading” question would place very little restraint on the Commission’s 
powers to compel the provision of incriminating evidence.39  Although the O’Halloran 
decision could be read as suggesting that the scope of the privilege may be 
somehow less extensive in “regulatory” contexts, it should be borne in mind that, 
according to the Strasbourg court’s case law, any limitation cannot go as far as to 
impair this right in its essence.
40
  
         In this specific respect it should also be reminded that, according to the 2011 
Best Practices’ Guidelines, adopted by the Commission and concerning the conduct 
of competition investigations, the investigating officers are obliged to give the 
undertakings’ staff and representatives a “Miranda type warning” during the 
preliminary stages of the investigations and especially before requesting 
                                                 
32
 Case 27/88, Orkem v Commission, [1989] ECR 3355, para. 28. 
33
 Id., para. 35. 
34
 Case C-238/99, LVM NV and others v Commission, [2002] ECR I-8375, para. 275, 279-282.  See 
also case C-301/04 P, Commission v SGL Carbon, [2006] ECR I-5915, para. 40, 43. 
35
 Id., para. 34. 
36
  See case T-112/98, Mannesmannrohren Werke v Commission, [2001] ECR II-729, para. 66.  For 
commentary, see inter alia, RILEY, “Saunders and the power to obtain information in Community and 
United Kingdom competition law”, (2000) 21 ELRev 264 at 269; also WILLIS, “ ‘You have the right to 
remain silent…’ or do you? The privilege against self-incrimination following Mannesmannrohren-
Werke and other recent decisions”, (2001) 22 ECLR 313. 
37
 Appl. 8225/78, Ashingdane v United Kingdom, [1985] 7 EHRR 528, para. 57.  See, inter alia, WILS, 
“Self-incrimination in EC antitrust enforcement: a legal and economic analysis”, (2003) 26 W. 
Comp.567 at 575. 
38
 See, mutatis mutandis, case C-60/92, Otto v Postbank, [1993] ECR I-5683, para. 16-20.  For 
commentary see RILEY, cit. (fn. 36), p. 269. 
39
 HOGAN, “The use of compelled evidence in European competition law cases”, in HAWK (Ed.), 
International Antitrust Law and Policy, Annual Proceeds from the Fordham Corporate Law Institute, 
2005: New York, Juris Publishing, p. 659 at 672-673. 
40
 See e.g., mutatis mutandis, appl. No 54810/00, Jalloh v Germany, [2007] 44 EHRR 32, para. 117. 
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information.41  However, it must be emphasised that no similar warning must be 
given in the course of inspections and that in any case, the right of investigated 
undertakings to resist questioning remains limited to the Orkem concept of privilege.  
It is added that, in any event, this requirement is only laid down in an administrative 
statement which, despite giving rise to legitimate expectations vis-à-vis the 
Commission, does not appear to have been sanctioned by the ECJ so far.  Against 
this background, it could be doubted whether the EU concept of right to silence, 
which places more emphasis on the nature of what is asked than on the type of 
coercion exerted on the investigated parties could be compatible with the 
Convention’s principles and especially with the continuing need to strike a balance, in 
accordance with the principle of proportionality, between its protection and the 
attainment of goals of public interest, whenever one of the rights granted by the 
Convention is limited.
42
 
         In light of the above, it is contended that such a restrictive and relatively rigid 
reading of the right to silence in EU competition cases may become less and less 
tenable in the context of the changing landscape for human rights’ protection in the 
EU, resulting from the Treaty of Lisbon, i.e. the direct applicability of the EU Charter 
as a binding source of human rights rules and the forthcoming accession to the 
Convention itself.  Thus, it is concluded that these developments are very likely to 
prompt a new discussion on these issues and to offer the opportunity for a challenge 
of the substance of the EU fundamental rights’ guarantees before the Strasbourg 
Court.  These issues will be examined in more detail in section 3. 
 
2.3. Commission inspections—the right to “privacy” of commercial premises and the 
involvement of domestic courts 
 
Section 2.2 considered some of the questions arising from the EU law concept of 
right to silence, especially in light of the corresponding ECHR rules.  This section will, 
instead, be concerned with the question of whether investigated parties, whether 
natural or legal persons, can claim the respect of the right to “privacy” of their 
commercial premises against competition investigations.  The power of the 
Commission to launch “dawn raids” of business premises, land and means of 
transport owned or occupied by investigated undertakings, according to Article 20 of 
Council Regulation No 1/2003, represents perhaps one of the most famous features 
of its detection powers; as with Article 18 the Commission may proceed either upon a 
simple request or via a formal decision to which the investigated parties are obliged 
to submit, on pain of financial sanctions for refusal to cooperate.43  The case handling 
officers are obliged to consult with the competent agencies before adopting a formal 
inspection decision and entitled to receive assistance from them.44   
         In addition, if it is so required by national law, the case handling officials must 
apply for judicial authorisation to conduct the inspection.  The court will be entitled to 
scrutinise the authenticity of the decision and to check that the latter is not “arbitrary” 
or “excessive” given the subject matter of the investigation.45  Whilst not being able to 
                                                 
41
 See Commission best Practices Guidelines on the conduct of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU 
investigations, available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/consultations/2010_best_practices/best_practice_articles.pdf, para. 14. 
42
 Inter alia, see, mutatis mutandis, R v Hertfordshire CC ex parte Green Environmental Industries Ltd, 
[2002] 2 AC 412, per Lord Hoffmann, p. 423. 
43
 Inter alia, BENJIAMIN, “The application of EC competition law and the European Convention on 
Human Rights”, (2006) 27(12) ECLR 693 at 694-695. 
44
 See e.g. PERRIN. “Challenges facing the EU network of competition authorities: insights from a 
comparative criminal law perspective”, (2006) 31(4) ELRev 540 at 549-550. 
45
 Id., p. 411.  See also RILEY, “The modernisation of EU anti-cartel enforcement: will the 
Commission grasp the opportunity?”, (2010) 31(5) ECLR 191 at 198. 
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“call into question the necessity for the inspection nor demand that it be provided with 
the information in the Commission’s file”, the court can make inquiries with the 
Commission on the grounds of suspicion for the infringement, on its gravity and on 
the “nature of the involvement of the undertaking concerned”.46 
        In light of so extensive powers, a question has therefore emerged as to whether 
investigated parties can claim the protection of the “privacy” of their “home”, i.e. of 
their business premises.  This question has acquired particular importance since the 
European Court of Human Rights recognised the existence of a corresponding right 
under Article 8 of the Convention for professionals in respect to their offices in 
Niemitz.47  In its earlier case law the ECJ refused to extend this principle to 
commercial property owned or occupied by undertakings suspected of having 
infringed the competition rules, on the ground that the notion of “home” could not be 
stretched as far as to encompass this type of premises. 48  In its view, the procedural 
safeguards and the basic requirements as to the content of the decision ordering an 
inspection were sufficient to meet the basic threshold of protection of the rights of 
defence granted by EU law.49 
        Later developments of the case law of both the Strasbourg Court and of the ECJ 
have however contributed to the emergence of a different view on this question.  
After affirming in the Niemitz decision that Article 8 ECHR should extend to business 
premises, since activities of a “professional or business nature”, 50 the Human Rights’ 
Court held in Ste Colas Est that due to the breadth and to the correspondingly limited 
safeguards assisting their exercise, such as the absence of ex ante judicial control, 
the French competition authority’s investigative measures had infringed the 
applicant’s Article 8 rights.51   
         In this context, it was explained in Wieser that whether the search had been 
ordered by a judge, whether the warrant ordering that search placed reasonable 
limits over the scope of the search and provided sufficient information as to the basis 
for the “reasonable suspicion” entertained by the investigating authorities constituted 
key safeguards against arbitrariness,52 not only when the inspection affected the 
‘homes’ of natural persons but also business premises.53  As to the nature of the 
judicial scrutiny exercised by the domestic courts, the Strasbourg Court made clear in 
Ravon that a review limited only to points of law would not be sufficient to afford the 
individual or legal entity concerned an “effective judicial remedy”, pursuant to Article 
6(1) ECHR.  A more substantive examination of the grounds for suspicion and of the 
proportionality of the inspection, in light of the circumstances of the case, would have 
to be conducted by the judge.54 
         Thus, it could be argued that more recent case law of the Strasbourg court 
supports the view that not only is a right to “privacy” available to commercial entities 
as well as to natural persons; any measures interfering with the exercise of this right 
should also be open to appeal before the competent judicial authorities and be 
subjected to judicial control going beyond “formal” aspects of the decision ordering 
an inspection and extend to the grounds of suspicion for the infringement.55  This 
approach may be contrasted with the position adopted by the ECJ in its more recent 
case law.  In the Roquette Freres preliminary ruling the Court of Justice recognised 
                                                 
46
 See inter alia GRAHAM, EU and UK Competition law, 2010: Pearson, pp. 241-242.   
47
 Appl. No 13710/88, Niemietz v Germany, [1992] 14 EHRR 80, para. 29-31. 
48
 Case 46/87, Hoechst v Commission, [1989] ECR I-2859, para. 10, 14-18. 
49
 Id., para. 19-23, 31-33. See also case 85/87, Dow Benelux v Commission, [1989] ECR I-3137, 
para.18 et seq.; case T-66/99. Minoan Lines v Commission, [2003] ECR II-5515, para. 53-56. 
50
 Id., para. 29. 
51
 Id., para. 44-48; see also para. 28. 
52
 Appl. No 74336/01, Wieser and another v Austria, [2008] 46 EHRR 54, para. 57. 
53
 See Buck, cit. (fn. 95), para. 45; also Wieser, cit. (fn. 96), para. 58; see also para. 62. 
54
 Appl. No 18497/03, Ravon and others v France, judgment of 21 December 2008, unreported. 
55
 See also appl. No 41604/98, Buck v Germany, [2006] 42 EHRR 21, para. 46 et seq. 
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that EU law should protect the right to the inviolability not only of the ‘homes’ of 
natural persons, but also of business premises, in accordance with the general 
principle that ‘everyone’ be protected against the arbitrary or disproportionate 
exercise of public power.56  Consequently, it took the view that before authorising the 
NCA to inspect these premises on behalf of the Commission, the domestic courts 
should be allowed to “verify whether the Commission had acted in a way which was 
arbitrary or excessive having regard to the subject matter of the investigation”.57   
          As to the nature of this scrutiny, the Court reiterated that national courts could 
not review the “expediency” of the inspection or access confidential evidence58 but 
could only examine whether the case officials had established “reasonable grounds 
of suspicion” for the infringement and the involvement of the undertaking, if 
necessary by seeking assistance from the Commission.59  Importantly, this position 
was transposed almost verbatim by the EU legislature in council Regulation No 
1/2003, whose Article 20(8) states, inter alia, that “(…) the national judicial authority 
shall control that the Commission decision is authentic and that the coercive 
measures envisaged are neither arbitrary nor excessive having regard to the subject 
matter of the inspection (…).”  The same provision confirms also that domestic courts 
are not empowered to question either the expediency of the investigation or the 
lawfulness of the decision ordering the inspection, an issue which falls within the 
exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of Justice.   
         It is difficult to underplay the importance of Roquette Freres.  Commentators 
argued that, without subjecting the Commission’s powers of investigation to 
requirements of national law, the Luxembourg Court sought to ensure that the 
Commission did not overstep the boundaries of its coercive powers by ordering 
inspections in cases in which a formal decision would be clearly disproportionate to 
the aim pursued or patently unjustified having regard to the grounds of suspicion 
entertained by the case handling officials.60  At the same time, the Court limited the 
powers of the domestic court to exclude a consideration of the “merits” of the 
investigation.61  
         As to the question of whether this position is consistent with the relevant Article 
8 ECHR standards, it emerges that, along similar lines as the standards laid down by 
Strasbourg Court, the Court of Justice has allowed domestic courts to review the 
proportionality and non-arbitrariness of inspection decisions, when granting the 
authorisation to carry it out to the competent authorities.  Thus it could be argued that 
whilst not empowered to rule on the “expediency” of the inspection,62 domestic 
judges can scrutinise the prima facie seriousness of the Commission’s allegations, 
going beyond a merely “formal” control of the decision63 and therefore acting as a 
check against arbitrary or disproportionate measures.64  It should however be 
emphasised that the Court of Justice remains the ultimate judge of the legality of the 
Commission’s investigative measures, consistently with its function within  the 
Treaty’s institutional framework and with the principle of unity and consistency of EU 
                                                 
56
 Case C-94/00, Roquette Frères SA v Directeur général de la concurrence, de la consommation et de 
la répression des fraudes and Commission of the European Communities, [2002] ECR I-9011, para. 21, 
27-29. 
57
 Id., para. 52-53; see also paras. 61 and 71. 
58
 Id., para. 60-61, 70. 
59
 Id.,  para. 71, 75 and 79. 
60
 BERGHE and DAWES, “ ‘Little pig, little pig, let me come in’: an evaluation of the European 
Commission’s powers of inspection in competition cases”, (2009) 30(9) ECLR 407 at 410-411. 
61
 Id., p. 411-412. 
62
 Appl. No 18497/03, Ravon and others v France, judgment of 21 December 2008, unreported; see 
Buck, cit. (fn. 95), para. 45-46, 50. 
63
 See Wieser, cit. (fn. 96), para. 57. 
64
 See e.g. BENJIAMIN, “The application of EC competition law and the European Convention on 
Human Rights”, (2006) 27(12) ECLR 693 at 698. 
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law as a whole.  Consequently, it is suggested that in the event of allegations as to 
the infringement of the ECHR being raised against the Commission in this area, it 
would be necessary to consider the extent to which the integrity of the ECJ’s 
jurisdiction can be maintained while at the same time upholding the Convention’s 
safeguards in individual cases. 
 
2.4. Modernisation and parallel jurisdiction: limiting the scope of the principle of ne 
bis in idem too much? 
 
The previous sections considered a number of problematic issues arising from the 
impact of the Commission’s investigative powers on the rights to “due process” and, 
albeit within limits, to the “privacy” of business premises enjoyed by investigated 
undertakings.  The purpose of this section is to examine another question arising 
from the involvement of NCAs in the enforcement of the Treaty competition rules, 
namely the extent to which the parallel competence enjoyed, at least in principle, by 
the Commission and the NCAs in respect to alleged infringements taking place within 
their respective jurisdiction is compatible with the Convention’s protection against 
double prosecution and punishment, enshrined in Article 4 of its Protocol VII. 
          It is clear from Regulation No 1/2003 that this principle of parallel jurisdiction, 
allowing also for joint action by NCAs and the Commission, constitutes one of the 
centrepieces of the current Implementing Regulation, albeit subject to limits: in this 
respect, Article 11(6) states, in fact, that the Commission can seize jurisdiction in 
respect to individual cases currently investigated by other agencies if it considers that 
it would be in the “Community interest” to do so.65  It should however be emphasised 
that, as is apparent from more recent judicial decisions, the centrality of the 
Commission within the enforcement framework is likely to reinforce its right to expect 
“loyal cooperation” from other ECN members.66 
         In France Telecom the General Court held that the jurisdiction of individual 
NCAs would be merely contingent on the Commission’s taking action in respect to 
specific cases.67  Consequently, the domestic agencies can still be relieved of their 
jurisdiction even when they have already started their own investigations.68  The 
Court also confirmed that there would be no “clearing house” for new cases and that 
these would be subjected to flexible and not binding rules as to their allocation across 
the Network.69 It is difficult to downplay the France Telecom judgment: the General 
Court made clear that the “parallel jurisdiction” which all ECN members enjoy would 
not undermine the “general competence” conferred to the Commission and its 
“preponderant role” in EU competition enforcement,70 a competence which is not 
subject to a “veto” on the part of the domestic agencies but only to a general 
obligation to “inform” and “consult” with them.71  
                                                 
65
 Commission 2004 Notice on the ECN, para. 5-6; see also para. 8 and 34. 
66
 See RIZZUTO, “Parallel competence and the power of the EC Commission under Regulation No 
1/2003 according to the Court of First Instance”, (2008) 29(5) ECLR 286 at 288-289. 
67
 Case T-340/04, France Telecom v Commission,[2007] ECR II-573, para. 79-80. 
68
 Id., para. 78. 
69
 Id., para. 80. 
70
 RIZZUTO, “Parallel competence and the power of the EC Commission under Regulation No 1/2003 
according to the Court of First Instance”, (2008) 29(5) ECLR 286, p.290-291. 
71
 Id., p. 296-297; also, see case T340/04, cit. (fn. 64), para. 81. See e.g. Article 13, Council Regulation 
No 1/2003; mutatis mutandis, 2004 Network Notice, para. 21-22.  See also case 14/68, Walt Wilhelm v 
Bundeskartellamt, [1969] ECR 1, para. 3-4, 11; also cases C-238/99, C-244/99, C-245/99, C-247/99, 
C-250/99 to 252/99, C-254/99, Lymburgse Vinyl Maatschappij and others v Commission, [2002] ECR 
I-8375, para. 59.    For commentary, see e.g. EISMANBERGER and THYRI, “Third-country antitrust 
sanctions and EC law—Comments on the Advocate General’s Opinion in C-308/04 P SGL 
Carbon/Commission”, (2006) 27 ECLR 397 at 399; also, more generally, KERSE and KHAN, EC 
Antitrust Procedure, 3
rd
 Ed., 2005: London, Sweet and Maxwell, p. 431. 
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         It has been suggested that the possibility of “parallel filings” is likely to be 
limited72 and, according to the Commission itself, even capable of boosting 
deterrence, via the threat exercised by multiple enforcers.73  However, the joint 
responsibility of the Commission and the NCAs raises questions as to its 
compatibility with the principle of ne bis in idem.  According to Article 4, Protocol VII 
to the ECHR, no one can be tried or punished twice for the same offence;74 despite 
being originally applicable within the same national jurisdiction, the principle is 
recognised by Article 50 of the EU Charter as extending “within the Union”.75   
         It is added that the absence of binding criteria for the allocation of cases across 
the ECN may lead to outcomes that are inconsistent with the principle of legal 
certainty:76 it is in fact clear that the decentralisation of EU competition enforcement, 
sought by Council Regulation No 1/2003, has not been accompanied by the 
harmonisation of the procedural rules governing competition cases in each Member 
State.77  Accordingly, some commentators argued that the “flexible” case allocation 
could expose individual undertakings to considerable uncertainty as to the applicable 
law78 and could eventually lead to a “watering down” of the safeguards enjoyed by 
the investigated parties in individual jurisdictions.79 
         It is concluded that despite a push toward decentralised competition 
enforcement, the Commission retains its prime role within the enforcement structure, 
a role which is reflected in the “asymmetrical” relationship with the NCAs.  It is also 
clear that the principle of parallel jurisdiction underpinning Regulation No 1/2003 can 
                                                 
72
 Inter alia, WILS, “The EU network of competition authorities, the European Convention on Human 
Rights and the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU”, in EHLERMANN and ATANASIU (Eds.), 
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[2003] ECR II-2597, para. 89-90. For commentary, inter alia, GAUER, “Due process in the face of 
divergent national procedures and sanctions”, paper presented at the International Bar Association 2005 
Conference: “Decentralisation of EC Competition Law: a year in practice”, p. 7-8.  
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para. 22, 25, 29; cf. Oliveira v Switzerland, judgment of 30 July 1998 (HUDOC Reference No 
84/1997/868/1080), [1998] 28 EHRR 289, para. 27.  See, inter alia, WILS, Principles of European 
Antitrust enforcement, 2005: Oxford, Portland, Oregon, Hart Publishing, p. 96. 
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Klaus Brugge, [2003] ECR I-1345, para. 27-28, 35; also case C-150/05, Van Straaten v Staat der 
Nederlanden und Republiek Italie, [2006] ECR I-9327, para. 53, 57.  See also COMMISSION of the 
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idem in criminal proceedings, 23 December 2005, SEC(2005) 1767, COM(2005) final 696, p. 8-9. 
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 See e.g., mutatis mutandis, appl. No 28342/95, Brumarescu v Romania, [2001] 33 EHRR 35, para. 
61-62; also appl. No 37201/97, K-H W v Germany, decision of 22 March 2001, available at: 
http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?item=4&portal=hbkm&action=html&highlight=%22legal%
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Barreto (partly dissenting), para. 4-5. 
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lead to outcomes that appear inconsistent with key Convention principles, namely the 
ne bis in idem rule as well as the principle of legal certainty, both of which can be 
linked to the respect of the rule of law, inspiring all EU action.   
        Although the Commission and the EU legislature have sought to explain the 
current status quo in light of the need to boost cartel detection, it is submitted that the 
development of the human rights acquis initiated with the Treaty of Lisbon may soon 
prompt a reconsideration of the existing rules, either “spontaneously”, as a response 
to the impact of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, or “reactively”, as a response 
to possible and potentially successful challenges before the Strasbourg Court.  The 
next sections will consider the implications arising from, respectively, the direct 
applicability of the Charter and the accession to the ECHR on the part of the Union 
and concentrate on the problems especially arising from possible challenges of the 
lawfulness of competition enforcement on the part not only of the Commission but 
also of the NCAs, when acting within the remit of the ECN. 
 
3. The Treaty of Lisbon and its impact on the human rights acquis of the EU: internal 
checks and external scrutiny of Union action—the case of competition enforcement 
 
3.1. The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights as a “binding” human rights’ instrument: 
toward a rethinking of competition proceedings? 
 
The previous section briefly discussed some of the consequences of the Treaty of 
Lisbon for the existing human rights acquis of the EU and highlighted a number of 
substantial issues arising from the apparent divergence between the standards of 
“privacy” and “due process” granted to “everyone” by the ECHR (including 
commercial entities) and the corresponding safeguards offered by EU law to those 
undertakings suspected of having infringed the Treaty competition rules.   
        This section will, instead, be concerned with considering some of the more 
direct implications of the changed scope of the human rights acquis of the EU 
resulting from the Treaty of Lisbon for competition enforcement proceedings.  It was 
anticipated in section 2.1 that the Treaty of Lisbon has taken two key steps toward 
more “visible”, if not outright stronger, human rights safeguards in the EU, by 
providing an express legal basis for Union accession to the ECHR as well as by 
conferring binding legal force to the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights.  This 
subsection aims to illustrate, albeit in brief, some of the possible consequences of the 
application of the Charter to competition enforcement proceedings before the 
Commission as well as within the ECN.   
         It was noted earlier that the Charter constitutes the “point of arrival” of the 
process of “consolidation” of fundamental rights’ guarantees within the EU legal 
framework.80  Inspired by the general principles of EU law providing for fundamental 
rights’ protection, the Charter makes explicit a number of rights and principles, 
ranging from “classic” civil liberties, such as the right to privacy, enshrined in Article 
9, to rights that are more “specific” to the Union, such as the right to “good 
administration”, provided by Article 41.81   
           Perhaps more important are the “horizontal clauses” of the Charter: according 
to Article 51(1), its provisions are applicable to the action not only of the EU 
institutions and bodies, but also of the national agencies that act within the scope of 
EU law.  Article 52(3) addes that whenever the Charter caters for rights that 
correspond to safeguards contained in the ECHR, the Convention will provide the 
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 Supra, section 2.1, fn. Xx and accompanying text.  See e.g. SYRPIS, “The Treaty of Lisbon: much 
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“minimum standard” for their protection, thus leaving the Union free to establish more 
generous safeguards for these rights.82  Although both the EU institutions and 
several commentators have stressed the relationship of continuity existing between 
the Charter and the ECJ’s case law on fundamental rights, of which the ECHR has 
represented a key source of inspiration,83 it is undeniable that Article 52(3) has 
brought about a significant change in the status of the Convention within EU law.  On 
this point, Weiss argued that this provision “goes beyond a mere interpretational 
guideline” and instead “speaks in favour of an incorporation of Convention standards” 
which as a result will become binding on the EU institutions for those rights that are 
common to both the Charter and the ECHR.84 
         Although it is undeniable that the interpretation of the Charter, just as that of the 
Treaty, will remain entrusted with the ECJ, as “guardian” of the unity and autonomy 
of EU law, the new position of the Convention within the EU human rights’ acquis is 
likely to have significant consequences for the overall fairness standards governing 
competition enforcement.  It should be emphasised that safeguards of “fair 
procedure” in non-judicial proceedings have been read by the European Court of 
Human Rights within the Convention, which also encompass other rights, including 
the right to the privacy of business premises and the ne bis in idem rule.  Importantly, 
these safeguards find a counterpart in the EU Charter: its Article 41 enshrines a right 
to “good administration” to everyone that is affected by the activity not only of the EU 
agencies, but also of domestic authorities acting within the scope of EU law.  
Furthermore, Article 48 sanctions the respect of the “rights of defence” and of the 
presumption of innocence as EU fundamental rights and Article 50 adds that the 
principle of ne bis in idem should be enjoyed by everyone in respect to any “offence 
for which [they] have already been finally acquitted or convicted within the Union in 
accordance with the law.”   
         Against this background, it could legitimately be questioned whether the 
divergence existing between the Convention and EU law as regards specific aspects 
of these rights remains justifiable in light of the Charter and especially of its horizontal 
provisions.  On this point, it should be emphasised that in her Opinion in the Toshiba 
appeal case Advocate General Kokott defined the principle of ne bis in idem, as 
applicable in EU law, as a “general principle of law at EU level” which now also 
“enjoys the status of a fundamental rights”, by virtue of being enshrined in Article 50 
of the EU Charter.85  On that basis, she took the view that this principle would be 
applicable to “cross border situations” and consequently to “proceedings for the 
imposition of a fine in antitrust law because of their similarity to proceedings at 
criminal law”,86 subject to the “threefold condition of identity of the fact, unity of 
offender and unity of the legal interest protected (…)”.87  Although on the merits she 
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found that these requirements had not been satisfied,88 her advice to the Court may 
be read as a clear endorsement of the applicability of this principle as a result of 
which it may be envisaged that individual competition agencies may have to 
discontinue proceedings on the ground that a sanction has already been imposed in 
relation to the same alleged breach.89 
         In respect to the right to “good administration”,  Article 41 makes clear that  this 
safeguard comprises an entitlement to “have [one’s] affairs being treated fairly, 
impartially and within a reasonable time” by the EU institutions and bodies.  
According to a number of commentators, Article 41 should be intended as a cluster of 
“fair procedure” safeguards applicable to administrative action90 and, as a result of 
Article 52(3) should be read as encompassing at a minimum the components of a 
“fair procedure” established by the Strasbourg court in its “substantive” (as opposed 
to “formalistic”) interpretation of Article 6 ECHR.91  As was aptly put by Lord Millett, 
“the right to good administration is analogous to the right to a fair trial guaranteed by 
Article 6 ECHR in providing an umbrella for a non-exhaustive list of procedural 
guarantees” encompassing (but not limited to) the right to be heard, to have access 
to the evidence gathered by the institution concerned and to have the matter decided 
within a reasonable time.92   
         Thus, bearing in mind the implications of the Charter’s horizontal provision, it 
could be argued that a “practical and effective” application of Article 41 to individual 
cases may soon call in question existing standards of protection of individual 
components of this right to “administrative due process” in the context of EU 
competition proceedings, such as, inter alia, the right to resist requests for potentially 
incriminating information.93  Although it is acknowledged that the ECJ has often dealt 
with questions requiring the interpretation of the ECHR in a markedly “autonomous” 
manner vis-à-vis the Strasbourg Court’s approaches, it is contended that the Charter 
demands greater consistency between the EU and the Convention’s human rights 
safeguards.94  As a result, it could be argued that existing limitations to the scope of 
due process guarantees, such as the distinction, for the purpose of the right to 
silence in competition cases, between “factual” and “leading” questions, may soon 
have to give way to a more flexible, less rigid and more “coercion-focused” view of 
this right.95 
        The direct applicability of the EU Charter is, however, likely to give rise to more 
pressing questions having regard to the principle of parallel jurisdiction on which the 
functioning of the ECN is based.  As was anticipated, all the members of the Network 
enjoy joint competence to deal with infringements having their “centre of gravity” 
within their jurisdiction.  On this specific point, the Network Notice expressly 
contemplated the possibility that two or more agencies could investigate and sanction 
the same infringement, on the ground that, although the factual elements may be 
identical, the effects of the allegedly unlawful practice are going to be felt within 
different territories and with varying consequences.96  This outcome was expressly 
allowed by the ECJ as far back as the late 1960s, in the Walt Wilhelm judgment, and 
has been constantly reiterated out of a concern for upholding the effective 
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enforcement of the EU competition rules.97   Its application is, however, subject to the 
“contingent” power of the Commission to tackle specific allegations of competition 
breaches. 98 
         It is therefore clear that, as was illustrated in section 2.4, the principle of 
concurrent jurisdiction, even within the limits of Article 11(6), is not consistent with the 
rules on ne bis in idem dictated by the EU Charter.  It should be emphasised that its 
Article 50 upholds the protection against double jeopardy for everyone within the 
Union99 and, in accordance with Article 52(3), should be read consistently with the 
standards provided by the ECHR, whose Article 4, Protocol VII prohibits not only a 
second sanction, but also a fresh investigation and prosecution in respect to prima 
facie unlawful behaviour. 100  It is contended that the Commission and the EU 
legislature may soon be prompted to reconsider the features of the ECN and 
especially the nature of the principles and rules governing its operation in order to 
ensure compliance with the Charter.   
         It is added that even if Article 52(3) of the Charter was read rather 
“conservatively, as requiring the EU courts only to interpret Article 50 consistently 
with the Convention, the case may well arise in which an individual claimant could 
contest the legality of fresh sanctions imposed by the Commission in respect to a 
case already punished at domestic level.101  As was suggested by AG Kokott in her 
opinion in Toshiba, the court hearing a similar challenge be required to assess 
whether there is “identity” as to the facts and the party or parties involved in allegedly 
anti-competitive practices and, if those requirements were met, it would have no 
choice but to allow the appeal.102  Similar considerations may also be made when a 
second sanction is imposed by a domestic competition authority: it was anticipated 
that this measure would fall “within the scope of EU law” and would therefore be 
subject to the Charter’s standards.   
          Consequently, it is argued that, where a challenge brought before the 
competent national courts, the latter would have to scrutinise its lawfulness in 
accordance with the Charter rules, if necessary by seeking the assistance of the 
Court of Justice via the preliminary reference procedure, and, if it found that the facts 
for which the sanction had been imposed were the same as in an earlier case 
decided within the ECN, would have to strike down the NCA’s decision.  On this 
point, it is suggested that this outcome, consistent though it could be with the need to 
adhere to the Charter’s safeguards, questions key features of the enforcement 
framework established by Council Regulation No 1/2003, thus suggesting that stricter 
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limitations on the exercise of joint jurisdiction enjoyed by the ECN members may be 
required.   
            Although the limited purvey of this work does not allow for a more detailed 
examination of these issues, it should be noted that an interpretation of the principle 
of ne bis in idem which is more “generous” to the individual has already prevailed in 
respect to the issues arising from the consequences of criminal investigations and 
prosecutions for the exercise of the right to freedom of movement enjoyed within the 
single market.  According to Article 54 of the Convention implementing the Schengen 
Agreement into the EU legal framework:   
 
“A person whose trial has been finally disposed of in one Contracting Party 
may not be prosecuted in another Contracting Party for the same acts provided 
that, if a penalty has been imposed, it has been enforced, is actually in the 
process of being enforced or can no longer be enforced under the laws of the 
sentencing Contracting Party.” 
 
The ECJ has interpreted this provision as precluding a fresh investigation and 
punishment in respect to matters whose merits have already been decided upon 
either via a judicial decision (i.e. a decision condemning or acquitting the same 
defendant) or after, inter alia, plea bargaining procedures.103    
         It is acknowledged that it is not clear whether it would be justifiable to apply this 
reading of the ne bis in idem rules tout court to competition proceedings, especially 
taking into consideration the relative nature of the right to a “fair trial” and to a “fair 
procedure” within the ECHR itself.104  However, it is contended that interpreting 
Article 50 of the EU Charter in a manner which respects the Convention standards as 
a “minimum benchmark” could justify the recognition of limited force of 
“administrative res judicata” to decisions adopted not just by the Commission but also 
by the NCAs, so as to prevent fresh proceedings being initiated against the same 
investigated parties.105  
        In light of the above, it is argued that the provision, via the EU Charter, of 
certainly more “visible”, if not altogether more extensive human rights’ safeguards 
within the legal system of EU may have direct consequences for the legality of 
competition enforcement proceedings.  It was illustrated that the direct applicability of 
the Charter rules to individual cases may soon lead to challenges, either direct, 
through annulment actions, or indirect, via the preliminary reference procedure, 
before the EU courts, against the Commission’s investigative measures, whether 
implemented directly or through the medium of the NCAs.  It was added that similar 
challenges could occur also in respect to parallel or joint investigations initiated within 
the ECN, in light of the more stringent safeguards against double jeopardy provided 
by the Charter.  Consequently, it is concluded that, due to its impact on the legal 
status of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, the Treaty of Lisbon has confronted 
the Commission and the EU legislature with an “internal challenge” as to the legality 
of the existing enforcement framework thereby strengthening the case for more 
extensive safeguards of the rights of the investigated parties not just vis-à-vis the 
Commission’s investigations but against proceedings brought by domestic agencies. 
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3.2. Accession to the ECHR and competition enforcement: questions of fairness with 
more general implications 
 
Section 3.1 considered some of the questions arising from the impact of the changed 
legal status of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights under the Treaty of Lisbon on 
the legality of some of the features of competition proceedings before the 
Commission as well as of the rules governing the functioning of the ECN.  The 
purpose of this section will be to examine some of the implications of the accession 
of the EU to the ECHR.  The limited remit of this paper does not allow for any 
detailed consideration of these questions, which strike at the core of key principles 
governing the status of EU law and of its fundamental rights standards as well as of 
the institutional and judicial architecture established by the Treaties.  The issue of 
whether the EEC/EC/EU could accede to the Convention, for the purpose of going 
beyond its general commitment to human rights, democracy and the rule of law and 
effecting the consolidation of the ECHR guarantees into EU law, has been widely 
discussed in institutional and scholarly circles.  
         As is well known, the ECJ in 1996 ruled that the Community could not become 
a party to the Convention: in its view, since the Treaty did not confer on the 
Community the power to take action, either internally or externally, in the field of 
human rights protection, the EC could not negotiate accession without an ad hoc 
amendment to the Treaty.106  It was also emphasised that while respect for human 
rights remained a condition for the lawfulness of its action, stemming from the EC’s 
commitment to these principles, as enshrined, inter alia, in the ECHR itself,107 
accession would have determined overarching changes in the institutional framework 
for their protection.108  The ECJ pointed out that, as a result of its signing up to the 
ECHR, the Community would have become integrated in a different institutional set 
up, i.e. the machinery for the enforcement of the Convention provided by the Council 
of Minister and the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg, with far-reaching 
implications for the overall constitutional structure established by the Treaties.109  
Accession would have also resulted in the tout court transposition of the ECHR rules 
into Community law,110 thus potentially subjecting the role of the ECJ as ultimate 
“guardian” of EU law, to the powers of interpretation of the Convention enjoyed by 
the Strasbourg court.111 
        As was anticipated in section 2.1, the 1996 Opinion did not quell the debate on 
these issues and was also followed by a number of rulings in which the Human 
Rights’ Court affirmed that the Contracting States could not escape their obligations 
under the Convention when acting within the spectrum of a distinct international 
organisation, such as the UN or the Union itself.112  At the same time, however, by 
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laying down a “presumption of equivalent protection” for human rights within the EU 
vis-à-vis the standards dictated by the Convention,113 the Court sought to ensure that 
these “indirect challenges” would only be entertained in exceptional circumstances, 
namely when it could be shown that there had been a clear “breakdown” in the 
safeguards provided for fundamental rights within the international organisation.114 
         It is therefore clear that the Treaty of Lisbon, by laying down an express legal 
basis for the EU to accede to the Convention, has cleared up perhaps the major 
“formal” hurdle standing in the way of the ECHR becoming an integral part of EU law 
as well as of the Union itself becoming a respondent in individual actions brought 
before the Strasbourg court.  However, it is also clear that the Treaty has not 
resolved many of the structural and institutional problems that accession is likely to 
raise: for instance, what type of relationship should exist between the ECJ and the 
Strasbourg court in respect to the interpretation of the Convention? Should the Union 
be involved in proceedings brought against Member States in respect to measures 
adopted “within the scope of Union law”, and if so, in what position? And to what 
extent should the ECJ itself, as “guardian of the Treaty”, be involved in challenges 
brought against EU acts? 
          It is acknowledged that many of these issues will be settled in the course of the 
accession negotiations.  However, it is equally clear that becoming a party to the 
Convention poses significant challenges for EU competition investigations, both 
before the Commission and within the ECN.  The remainder of this section will 
attempt to speculate on these challenges, especially in respect to the scrutiny of 
investigative measures and of competition infringement decisions adopted by the 
Commission and by the NCAs in individual cases and to consider how any problems 
arising from them are likely to be dealt with by the agencies involved.  In respect to 
the former, it is however indispensable to draw a distinction between measures 
adopted directly by the Commission and measures adopted by its domestic partners 
in compliance with their duties of cooperation within the ECN. 
         It was illustrated in section 2.2 that investigated undertakings enjoy a very 
limited right to remain silent in the face of potentially incriminating questioning on the 
part of the Commission; consequently, it was contended that after accession this 
perceived divergence between the standards applied under the Convention and 
those recognised by the ECJ may well give rise to a direct challenge in Strasbourg, 
especially given the “criminal nature” assigned to competition cases under the 
ECHR.  In this specific respect, it is suggested that the possibility of such a challenge 
is not likely to give rise to particularly “complicated” procedural outcomes: in the 
event of a decision requesting self-incriminating information from an undertaking, the 
latter will be able to challenge it before the EU Courts on the ground that such a 
request violates its Article 6 rights, on the ground of the nature of the information and 
to the coercive nature of the decision itself.  If the challenge is unsuccessful both on 
first instance and on appeal before the ECJ, the applicant will be able to bring a 
direct challenge against the decision before the Strasbourg court, its “domestic 
remedies” having being exhausted as required by Article 35 of the Convention.115   
         It is suggested that this outcome is fully consistent with Protocol 8 to the Lisbon 
treaty, which expressly envisages for the accession treaty negotiations to encompass 
the establishment of a mechanism for the direct action brought against the Union 
before the Convention organs.  However, it is unclear what outcome such a 
challenge would have on the investigation and on the decision concluding it: would a 
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successful challenge before the Strasbourg court result in the automatic invalidity of 
the final Commission decision, finding, for instance, an infringement of the 
competition rules? And if that was the case, would the Commission be allowed to 
take a fresh action against the undertaking in question? 
          Two solutions can be envisaged: on the one hand, the Commission may have 
to restart its investigations afresh and in the course of these new proceedings avoid 
seizing the evidence that the Strasbourg court had ruled to be “inadmissible” on due 
process grounds.  If, on that basis, the Commission found the existence of an 
infringement, then it would not be precluded from sanctioning the investigated 
undertaking.  On the other hand, it could be suggested that the Commission be no 
longer empowered to take action against the investigated undertaking, unless new 
evidence pointing to the existence of a competition infringement, independent from 
that giving rise to the infringement of the due process rules, was later uncovered.   
         It is acknowledged that the former solution appears consistent with existing 
standards governing competition investigations: on this point, it bears recalling that, 
according to, inter alia, the General Court in Re: Soda Ash, the final decision would 
be invalid on the due process grounds only if the Commission had relied on 
“inadmissible” evidence in reaching its conclusions as to the existence (or otherwise) 
of an infringement.116  Thus, if the Commission was able to establish, to the requisite 
level of proof, that an infringement had been committed without relying on unlawfully 
obtained evidence, the final decision would be valid.117  However, it is questionable 
whether this outcome would still be acceptable in light of Article 50 of the EU Charter, 
which, similarly to Article 4, protocol VII to the ECHR, affords to everyone the right 
not to be prosecuted and sanctioned twice for the same course of unlawful behaviour 
within the Union.  On this point, it could be suggested that preventing tout court fresh 
investigations, on the one hand, would ensure the closest adherence to the 
Convention’s own reading of ne bis in idem: on the other hand, however, it would 
have the drawback of “straightjacketing” the Commission by preventing action even 
when the “admissible” evidence would be enough to establish the existence of a 
breach. 
        Against this background, it is argued that allowing the Commission to derogate 
from the protection against double jeopardy only when it could, on the basis of 
“admissible” evidence, establish an infringement, would represent perhaps the most 
“acceptable” solution, both for the purpose of ensuring effective competition 
enforcement and for the observance of the ECHR.  In fact, on the one hand, it would 
leave to the Commission a limited “space for manoeuvre” to prosecute the alleged 
infringement, subject, however, to new, lawfully acquired evidence of the 
infringement being gathered118 and thereby maintain the effectiveness of its 
enforcement powers.  On the other hand, it would ensure that infringements be only 
based on “lawfully acquired” evidence, thus limiting the scope for the abuse of the 
investigated parties’ enforcement rights. 
        Similar considerations may be made when an undertaking alleges that, as a 
result of an infringement decision adopted by the Commission or by a NCA, its right 
not to be investigated and sanctioned twice for the same alleged competition breach 
was infringed:  it is suggested that in this case the applicant would have to exhaust 
the domestic remedies available to it, either in the domestic or in the EU legal 
framework, depending on who adopted the allegedly unlawful decision and thereby 
petition the Strasbourg court, in accordance with Article 35 ECHR.119 
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        Different questions arise when an investigative measure is carried out by a NCA 
on behalf of the European Commission. It was illustrated in section 2.3 that, 
according to the ECJ in Roquette Freres, the domestic judiciaries retain limited 
powers of scrutiny over the execution, on the part of the competition agencies, of 
Commission’s investigative decisions.120  However, in that preliminary ruling the 
Court emphasised that the power to rule over the validity of these measures rested 
ultimately with the ECJ itself and that consequently domestic courts should seek 
assistance from Luxembourg if any such dispute arose.121  It is equally apparent that, 
as agencies of the Contracting States, NCAs remain in any event subjected to the 
Convention rules and to the scrutiny exercised by the Strasbourg Court.   
        As a result, the question emerges as to the possible implications of accession 
for those cases in which the NCA is merely an “agent” for the Commission: should 
the contracting state be the defendant in the event of a direct challenge? Or should 
the EU be called to respond to any allegations of ECHR infringement stemming from 
investigative activity conducted only by proxy by the NCAs?  Several commentators 
argued that this question is extremely relevant, first of all, for individual applicants, 
since it determines who should stand in judgment against them in these 
circumstances.122  Secondly, it raises a key issue for the integrity and autonomy of 
EU law, since it would suggest the possibility for the Strasbourg court, in substance, 
to rule over issues related to the division of competences between the Union and the 
Member States.  And thirdly, it poses the problem of whether, and if so, how, the ECJ 
should be “involved” in these proceedings before the Strasbourg court.123  
         It is suggested that one answer to the more general problem of determining the 
identity of the defendant could be to allow an individual applicant to sue the EU 
directly, just as it would have been possible if the Commission had both issued and 
executed the investigative measure:  it could be argued that while Contracting States 
cannot be “excused” from respecting the ECHR while acting within the framework of 
other international organisations, including the EU, in these cases they would be 
acting entirely as proxies to the Commission.124  Thus, absent any discretion on their 
part, the Union should be held liable for any infringement allegedly resulting from the 
implementation of an act of its institutions.  
         This solution was, however, criticised: Lock argued that, first of all, it is often 
difficult to appraise the scope of discretion enjoyed by domestic agencies 
implementing EU law measures; and secondly, the individuals concerned may have 
been in contact only with the domestic agencies, and not with the Commission.125  It 
should be emphasised that the drafters of the accession agreements were clearly 
mindful of these problems and therefore envisaged the creation of a “co-respondent 
mechanism”, according to which the EU should stand in judgment together with the 
Member State concerned in every case in which the domestic authorities had no 
significant discretion as to the way in which the EU measure should be implemented 
and therefore had no other option but to take a course of action which was 
inconsistent with the Convention.126  This solution was welcomed as a means to 
avoiding “gaps” in the human rights’ scrutiny of the Union’s “delegated” action as well 
as being consistent with the principle, enshrined in Matthews and Bosphorus, 
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according to which Member States cannot avoid liability for Convention infringements 
when acting within the scope of Union law.127   
       However, adopting the co-defendant mechanism leaves unresolved the further 
question of whether allowing the Strasbourg court to decide, in substance, over the 
validity of a Union measure, albeit in a specific case and within the respect of the 
limits dictated by the “margin of appreciation” doctrine, remains consistent with the 
principle of autonomy and internal consistency of EU law.128  It is noteworthy that 
later versions of the draft accession agreement have sought to “mellow down” the 
“normative conflict” requirement as to allow the Union to stand as co-respondent 
when “it appears that [an] allegation [of infringement of the ECHR] calls into question 
the compatibility” of Union provisions or measures with the Convention rights.129  It is 
acknowledged that this draft provision is less likely to prove “controversial”, since it 
only asks the Strasbourg court to identify, via a superficial scrutiny of individual 
applications, the existence of any such prima facie “conflict”.130   
         However, it still “leaves the door open” for the Strasbourg court to rule (albeit 
indirectly) over the validity of EU law via the medium of domestic action and therefore 
without the prior involvement of the EU agencies in the controversy between the 
Member State and the individual concerned.  Although it could be argued that the co-
defendant mechanism could allow for this involvement after a direct challenge has 
already been brought, it could be queried whether creating a mechanism allowing the 
ECJ to “have a say” on the allegations before a decision is adopted in Strasbourg 
may be a more appropriate way of reconciling the unity and consistency of EU law 
with the effectiveness of the ECHR guarantees.131   
         It could be argued that empowering the Luxembourg court to review the 
offensive EU measure (or a domestic measure adopted within the scope of EU law) 
prior to a pronouncement of the Human Rights’ court would allow for an “internal”, 
more timely and, since the ECJ could strike down the impugned act, more immediate 
redress of the applicant’s interests.132  In addition, according to the 2010 Discussion 
Document, published by the Court’s Presidency, allowing for this form of control 
would be indispensable to maintain the unity and consistency of EU law and the 
“necessary coherence” of the EU system of remedies.133  The Discussion Document 
emphasised that domestic courts do not enjoy the power to strike down an EU act as 
invalid, a “prerogative” which, instead, rests exclusively with the ECJ.  Consequently, 
it was argued that “the possibility must be avoided of the European Court of Human 
Rights being called on to decide on the conformity” of Union measures with the 
ECHR without the ECJ having been allowed to entertain the question of the validity of 
the same measure in light of the EU fundamental rights’ principles.134   
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         However, some commentators argued, not without merit, that the prior 
involvement of the ECJ may not always be necessary or indeed justifiable in light of 
the type of scrutiny carried out by the Strasbourg court and especially of its 
consequences: for instance, Lock argued that since the European Human Rights’ 
Court’s decision could not lead to the “invalidation” of the EU measure in question, 
but only to a finding of infringement and to the award of damages no danger for the 
“unity” of EU law would arise.135  It was also contended that, in any event, it would be 
difficult for the ECJ to “enforce” on the national courts, even those “of last resort”, an 
obligation to refer similar questions to it within the preliminary reference procedure 
even within he limits placed on the ability of “higher” courts to decline to make a 
reference.136  Thus, it was suggested that the “co-respondent mechanism” would 
provide a “residual” avenue for the EU organs to become involved in human rights’ 
disputes involving Member States on account of their fulfilment of EU obligations 
even when no such reference has been made.137   
         Other authors questioned whether this intervention would be required for the 
purpose of the admissibility of an individual complaint: Jacque’, for instance, 
contended that it would be “unfair” to rely on the requirement of exhaustion of 
domestic remedies to frustrate an individual applicant’s right to access the 
Strasbourg court if a domestic court had declined to make a reference to 
Luxembourg (for instance on grounds of acte clair138) or to follow the preliminary 
ruling in its decision.139  It is argued that this question is even more relevant in the 
context of competition investigations carried out by ECN members: in fact, both the 
ECJ in Roquette Freres and the EU legislature in Council Regulation No 1/2003 
expressly provide that domestic courts should seek the assistance of the Court, via 
the preliminary reference procedure, when the validity of an investigative measure 
issued by the Commission and implemented in a domestic jurisdiction was at 
stake.140  It is added that allowing the ECJ to decide over these questions before a 
dispute reaches the Strasbourg court, besides ensuring that the function of the Court 
as “guardian of the Treaties” remained intact, would allow the Court to decide on the 
issue in light of Union law and therefore to secure human rights’ compliance 
“internally”,141  consistently with the “subsidiary” nature of the adjudication function 
exercised by the Strasbourg Court on the action of the Contracting Parties.142   
          It is however beyond question that this view leaves open the question of how 
such a mechanism should be structured, especially in cases when no such reference 
has been made.  On this point, several commentators raised the concern that an 
individual complaint may be declared inadmissible for want of a preliminary 
reference, even if the domestic court had declined to seek the assistance of the ECJ, 
for instance on acte clair grounds.143  It should be recalled that the preliminary 
reference does not constitute a “remedy” in light of the established case law of the 
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ECJ regarding, for instance, the issue of what is the “court of last resort” for the 
purpose of determining when an obligation to refer arises under Article 267 TFEU.144   
         This view was confirmed by the Presidents of the ECJ and of the European 
Court of Human Rights when discussing the question of whether the requirement of 
“exhaustion of domestic remedies” should be made conditional upon seeking and 
obtaining a preliminary ruling from the ECJ.145  They suggested that a “flexible 
procedure” allowing the ECJ to carry out an “internal review” before the Strasbourg 
Court can entertain a specific case, should be put in place: in the words of the 
Presidents of the Courts, such a procedure would not require an amendment to the 
Convention and should be framed to take into account the features of the decision-
making of both courts146 as well as the need to avoid undue delays—for instance, by 
allowing the ECJ to deploy its accelerated procedure.147  In light of the forgoing, 
Jacque’ suggested that a revision by the ECJ itself of its Foto Frost case law in the 
sense of requiring expressly the domestic courts to refer a question when allegations 
as to the infringement of the ECHR had been made could already offer a reliable 
answer to these issues.148   
          It may be concluded that Article 6(2) of the TFEU, which expressly confers to 
the Union the competence to become a party to the ECHR, poses pressing questions 
as to how to accommodate the consequences of accession with well-established 
constitutional principles informing the unity and the internal coherence of the EU legal 
system as well as the relationship of the ECJ with “external” judiciaries, such as the 
Strasbourg court.  This section argued that direct challenges brought in relation to 
allegations arising from measures adopted by the Union agencies, such as the 
Commission, are likely to give rise to relatively few difficulties; it was added that when 
Union measures are implemented by domestic agencies, the “co-respondent 
mechanism” envisaged in the negotiations is likely to ensure a degree of 
“participation” and of “sharing of responsibility” between the EU and the national 
authorities involved.   
         However, it was also argued that more complex issues, striking at the core of 
the notion of unity and consistency of EU law, lie at the core of this debate, as was 
illustrated in relation to the question of whether and to what extent the ECJ should be 
involved in the external human rights’ scrutiny of Union action.  This section argued 
in favour of the creation of a mechanism to allow for the Court in Luxembourg to 
“have a say” on the human rights’ dispute before the latter reaches the Strasbourg 
court, on the ground that it would be consistent with existing principles and legislative 
rules as well as potentially beneficial to individual applicants.  The form which this 
scrutiny is likely to take and the way in which it can be reconciled with the existing 
admissibility requirements provided in the ECHR remains, however, left to the 
accession negotiations. 
 
4. EU competition enforcement after the Treaty of Lisbon’s impact on the Union’s 
human rights acquis—a story still (largely) unwritten? Tentative conclusions 
 
The Treaty of Lisbon has brought about a number of momentous changes in the 
human rights’ acquis of the EU: from conferring binding force to the EU Charter of 
Fundamental Rights to creating an express legal basis for the accession to the 
ECHR, the Member States have pushed human rights’ protection up on their agenda 
for reform.  The previous sections have illustrated that this momentum is likely to 
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have significant and far-reaching consequences for the status quo characterising 
competition enforcement, both before the EU Commission and within the European 
Competition Network at large.  It was argued that the legally binding value 
recognised to the EU Charter could already provide the engine for a number of 
changes in the existing due process standards, ranging from the scope of the right to 
silence from the meaning to be ascribed to the principle of ne bis in idem in antitrust 
investigations conducted across the Union.   
        It is however equally apparent from the above commentary that ECHR 
accession is likely to give rise to potentially more serious procedural and institutional 
implications not just for competition enforcement but for the Union’s institutional 
framework as a whole.  Section 3.2. illustrated how Article 6(2) TFEU did not provide 
any “practical” answers to the question of how to reconcile the effective application of 
the Convention with equally important concerns, such as that for maintaining the 
unity and consistency of EU law vis-à-vis the external judicial scrutiny exercised by 
the Human Rights’ Court.  It was shown that the issue of the involvement of the ECJ 
in this external scrutiny actually harbours more general issues arising from the 
interplay of the principle of subsidiarity, which should remain at the basis of the 
ECHR review machinery, with the principle of coherence and of autonomy of EU law.  
The above analysis has also raised strong concerns for the division of jurisdiction 
between the ECJ and the Human Rights’ court in the appraisal of individual 
complaints lodged, directly or via the co-respondent mechanism, against the Union: it 
was argued that although more recent versions of the draft accession agreements 
have sought to limit the scope for scrutiny of individual complaints at admissibility 
stage by “mellowing down” the “normative conflict” requirement, governing the co-
respondent mechanism, they have not answered the core question of the scope and 
intensity of the scrutiny powers exercised by the Human Rights’ court over EU action. 
         It was added that these questions are likely to become even more serious in 
cases in which the ECJ has had no prior involvement.  Although it was argued that 
the involvement of the Court of Justice may remain necessary in the context of the 
human rights scrutiny of competition investigations to comply with existing legal 
principles and legislative norms, how it can actually be accommodated with the need 
to apply the Convention both practically and without “undue delay” remains an open 
question.  It is therefore hoped that, in the course of the ongoing accession 
negotiations, the Union’s and the ECHR’s representatives will take into consideration 
the broad array of views and of suggestions made by all relevant stakeholders with a 
view to fashioning arrangements that are capable to reconcile effective human rights’ 
protection with the integrity of the existing institutional and constitutional 
arrangements of the EU, for the purpose of maintaining the Union legal system’s 
inner coherence and increasing, through the medium of the adherence to the 
Convention, its legitimacy. 
 
